Darius Garland is a goldfish

Garland can and should be better, but is there enough space for him to grow?

In biology, there is a concept called “indeterminate growth.” Unlike humans, who plateau at a consistent time and size, plenty of flora and fauna grow as much as their environment allows. Theoretically, you could have a world-sized goldfish if you had enough food and a tank the size of the solar system.

Darius Garland is that goldfish; his team needs to change the size of his bowl.

Let’s back up a second. After a 2021-2022 season in which he averaged 21.7 points and 8.6 assists while shooting nearly 40% from deep, Darius Garland was one of the league’s brightest young stars.

Steph Curry was raving about him. Rookie big Evan Mobley became Garland’s most-assisted teammate and looked like a future superstar running mate. Only six other players in NBA history had put up as many assists and points by their third year as Garland. If you look around and see Oscar Robertson and Tiny Archibald chatting in a nearby booth while Luka Doncic orders a recovery beer at the bar, you’re in pretty good company.

Then the Cavaliers traded a massive package for Donovan Mitchell.

I want to be clear: this was a good trade for Cleveland. Michell is the sort of dominant perimeter scorer every team needs. He came in sixth in the MVP race and put up career-best scoring numbers (28.3 points per game) and efficiency while leading Cleveland to a top-four seed.

But how did Mitchell’s arrival impact Garland?

On the surface, Garland looked like he froze in place. His surface stats were freakishly similar to the year prior: 21.7 points on 46.2% shooting in ‘22 compared to 21.6 on an identical 46.2% in ‘23.

But freezing implies stasis. A closer look shows all the ways Garland improved and changed.

The most obvious: he took advantage of the defense keying in on Mitchell to further improve his off-ball marksmanship. Garland hit 41% of his triples last season compared to 38% the season before. 58% of those were assisted compared to 49% the year prior.

He also refined his dribble-drive game even more. Garland is one of the most dynamic ballhandlers in the NBA, boasting a now-you-see-it, now-you-don’t dribble package paired with one of basketball's most devastating shot fakes. The full-extension up-fake became his signature move:

Garland’s not a vertical athlete, but he’s blink-quick with the ball and knows how to utilize the threat of his shot to keep defenders off-balance. He has impeccable footwork in the post, which allows him to get off attempts even when he’s well-defended:

One area that Garland substantially improved upon: foul drawing. Garland has steadily increased his free throws each season, culminating in last year’s 4.7 per game (an above-average number for a point guard). That he improved even with Mitchell’s arrival eating into his touches (literally — DG averaged 77 touches per game compared to 86 the year prior) is a fantastic sign.

Free throws are a big part of most stars’ scoring packages, and they significantly raise the floor on Garland’s day-in and day-out scoring. Garland is more of a finesse-and-footwork kind of player than a physical bruiser, but unlike many of his height-deficient peers, Garland will use his change of direction and speed to initiate contact and draw the foul:

When Garland chose to move outside the arc, he was adept at both catch-and-shoots (44% last year) and pull-ups off the dribble (39%). On the ball, he created separation with some truly outlandish sidesteps, stepbacks, and sprint-outs:

His release is a little funky, with a shooting hand that flies way out in front of him like a startled pigeon. But it’s quick, and he has range from way behind the arc.

The biggest issue for Garland: finishing when he got to the hoop. He’s hit 57% at the rim for three straight seasons, a subpar number for anyone. It was exacerbated when he went to his strong side. Synergy Sports says Garland drove right 52% of the time but only hit 33% on shots taken on those actions (he nailed 47% going left). Many floater-heavy righties (and Garland has a beautiful floater) prefer and are better at driving left since it creates an easier launch angle, but this is an unusually disparate split. DG’s speed occasionally got him into trouble, too, as a small bump could send the slightly-built Garland flying out of control.

That speed was an asset on defense, though. The Cavaliers were the best defensive team in the league, even with two smaller guards up top, thanks primarily to Jarrett Allen and Mobley’s dominance down low and Isaac Okoro’s strong wing play. But last year was Garland’s best defensive effort by far, and he proved that he could be adequate enough on that end to be an acceptable weakest link.

Advanced defensive metrics generally painted a flattering light, although he got an artificial boost from Cleveland’s bulletproof team stats. He’ll never be a stopper. Even in isolation, though, Synergy Sports put him in the 39th percentile as a defender — below the median, but not terrible.

A minor knock on Garland was his poor rebounding, which worsened after Mitchell’s arrival. Despite playing two very tall men down low, Cleveland was not a good defensive or offensive rebounding team. Garland is neither a disciplined boxer-outer nor a high-motor ball-chaser, which hurt the Cavs on the margins (there’s a similar problem in Minnesota, but I digress).

Finally, Garland has a true point guard mentality — he’s looking for his teammates first and his own shot second. He’s been accommodating to the point of deferential with first Collin Sexton, then Mitchell. That’s usually a great thing, but occasionally it led to him passing up shots (particularly threes) that he should have launched. (It’s appreciated by his squad, though — Garland was a finalist for Teammate of the Year.)

Still, particularly as an offensive player, Garland left little to be desired. And yet, as the playoffs showed, Cleveland needs more.

The Cavs were analytical darlings last season, but the first round went poorly for Cleveland against a bullying, confident New York Knicks squad. While a turned ankle in Game 3 didn’t help, Garland was consistently hounded into sloppy turnovers (he got caught in the air with nowhere to go several times) and difficult shots:

Garland looked uncharacteristically frustrated as the team’s offense couldn’t rise above the mud the Knicks gleefully chucked at them. No other Cavaliers stepped up to take pressure off the two star guards, who each had moments but couldn’t sustain quality play for extended stretches.

Defensively, Garland was attacked, but that’s the inevitable fate of any team’s smallest player. He can be feisty enough to turn endless isolations against him into fool’s gold. The Cavs’ half-court defense against the Knicks was quite stout.

Even if Garland wasn’t a major problem on either end, however, Cleveland needed him to be part of the solution. In his fourth year, he wasn’t good enough to raise the team to another level when it mattered. He can and should be going forward. Virtually every young player hits a speed bump in their first playoffs. The quarter-billion-dollar question, though: how much room will there be for Garland to grow his game next year?

This isn’t necessarily a fit issue, like, say, Josh Giddey and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander. Mitchell and Garland were one of the most potent duos in the league, and the team outscored opponents by +8.9 points per 100 possessions when they shared the court. But it’s clear that when push meets shove, Mitchell will be the guy.

Evan Mobley, the Cavs’ defensive superstar, is on the rise, too. He averaged nearly 17 points per game in his second year (even if the three-point stroke never appeared), and it’s reasonable to think he’ll need the ball more on offense this year.

So where does that leave Garland?

Frankly, the best option would be an offensive overhaul to replicate something like the Warriors and Kings do: a heavy off-ball-movement and decision-tree-based approach that empowers everyone. But it’s a complicated system for coaches to teach, much less players to implement, and that seems unlikely to happen anytime soon.

Systemically, while Mitchell and Garland mostly avoided the dreaded “your-turn, my-turn” stagnation in the regular season, it appeared at times during the playoffs. They weren’t always put in the best position to succeed, either.

The Cavaliers playbook is a little stale, a little too big-small pick-and-roll heavy for my tastes. P&R isn’t nearly as effective without proper spacing, so perhaps it’ll work better this year with more shooting (new additions Max Strus and Georges Niang will be godsends in that regard), but the Cavs need more modern concepts. I would love to see some Thunder-like guard-guard screens for Mitchell and Garland, who rarely set picks for one another.

Garland’s off-ball capabilities also weren’t weaponized to the fullest — he should never be standing still without the ball. Only ~16% of his shots were catch-and-shoot threes, which feels low (Curry was at 25%, Damian Lillard was at 18%). Garland is an intelligent and willing off-ball mover, but play calls sometimes stationed him in corners for extended stretches, where it was easy for defenses to keep track of him.

Some of my favorite scripted Cavaliers actions involved Garland off-ball screens for a diving big man before he sprinted out to the top of the arc for a three:

That’s not a difficult or complex action, but the Cavs didn’t go to it (or other plays like it) as much as they could have. Constant movement is strenuous, but if that means he needs to play 34 minutes per game instead of 36, so be it.

Garland’s turnover rate of 12.2% is about average for a point guard, but as the playoffs showed, he can be susceptible to aggressive defenses. In approach, Garland is far more Steph Curry than Chris Paul, so some turnovers will always be baked in. It’s the cost he pays for creativity and improvisation, but that doesn’t mean he can’t negotiate a better price.

The good news: Garland reportedly spent the summer adding muscle, which should help him become a better finisher and more able to withstand playoff physicality.

We already know there’s more meat on the bone with Garland. In 10 games without Mitchell, DG put up 25.5 points and 9.0 assists while shooting 44% from deep. The Cavs are better with Mitchell than without, but better isn’t good enough. For Cleveland to make a deep playoff run, Garland needs space not just to improve, but to grow.

There’s a hell of a big fish inside Garland; can Cleveland make enough room?